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Alienation: The Case of the Catholics in Northern Ireland 
EDWARD P. MoxoN-BRoWNE 
Queen's University of Belfast 
Introduction 
The word 'alienation' carries a number of intrinsic connotations that 
are useful when examining a case of political alienation. For Marx, the 
estrangement of the individual from himself was to be remedied by aboli-
tion of private property so that the plight of the individual worker, forced 
to be simply the means to an economic end, might be shortcircuited. Freud 
saw the individual estranged from himself by living up to the expectations 
of others so that (as Marcuse was later to point out) the individual was no 
longer the originator of his own acts; he was no longer his true self. He lost 
interest in life because it was not he who was living it. 
Clearly, when we are talking about alienation of the Catholic com-
munity in Northern Ireland, we are using the term at a more superficial 
level. However, the historical and socio-psychological antecedents of the 
term are valuable adjuncts to the specifically political analysis. The 
alienated citizen is often apathetic because he is not recognized for what he 
is; and his identity may, at best, be ignored or, at worst, be denigrated. 
Political lassitude follows logically from a political identity being ghettoised 
into a backwater far removed from mainstream political life. A dictionary 
definition of 'alienation' will mention being 'estranged, ' 'foreign in nature,' 
and 'belonging to another place, person or family, especially to a foreign 
nation or allegiance.'' Such a definition usefully bridges the gap between 
the psychological ('estranged') aspect of the term and the political ('Belong-
ing to a foreign nation or allegiance') dimension. This coupling of two 
aspects of alienation are especially pertinent when we consider the Catholic 
minority in Northern Ireland. 
In a political context the term alienation denotes the sense of being or 
feeling, foreign. The alienated group is one that feels foreign although it 
resides within the state; it feels that it does not fully belong to the wider 
society and often withdraws into itself and becomes increasingly aware of 
its separate identity. Such a group is often a numerical minority but it need 
not be so . The crucial attributes are that it sees itself as being subordinate or 
marginal to the dominant political culture. Thus Blacks in South Africa, 
although numerically a majori _ty, are best analyzed as a minority, and an 
alienated minority within the South African state. Most alienated groups, 
however, are, numerically speaking, minority groups in a larger society, e.g. 
the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Jews of the Soviet Union, or the Sikhs in India. 
The word 'alienation' has recently become a prominent weapon in the 
battle of words between politicians in Britain and Ireland when referring to 
the position of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The New 
Ireland Forum Report 2 ascribed the impasse in Northern Ireland to the 
'alienation of nationalists in Northern Ireland from political and civil in-
stitutions, from the security forces and from the manner of application of 
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, The theme seemed to have struck a sympathetic chord when the 
t e a . . . 
tary of State for Northern Ireland, ma speech m July 1984, stressed 
Secre h · h h h. h h ct· . . 1 the importance of finding mec amsms t roug w 1c t e 1stmct natJona 
identity of Catholics could be expressed. More recently, after the Anglo-
I . h summit, the communique spoke of the need to cater for the separate 
-~is tity and aspirations of the minority. However, more recently still, 
~~nvember 1984) both the British Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher) and the 
: Northern Ireland Secretary (Mr. Hurd) publicly deplored the use of the 
::rd alienation implying that it was both an exaggeration and inaccurate. 
In response to those state'!1en~s t_her~ has been no shortage ~f sp?kesmen 
for the Catholic community md1catmg the extent of the alienation they 
perceive among their coreligionists. For example, the Bishop of Down and 
Connor, whose diocese includes Belfast, wrote in late November of 1984: 
It has been claimed this week, even at Prime 
Ministerial and Secretary of State level, that the degree 
of alienation has been exaggerated, perhaps even that 
the term itself if inappropriate. Living in day to day 
contact with the situation as I do, I have to assert quite 
categorically that the alienation in the nationalist com-
munity is real, it is profound, it 1s increasing, it is 
spreading to more and more sectors of that 
community. 3 
Since there appears to be wide disagreement between leading actors in 
the Northern Ireland situation as to whether and, if so how much, aliena-
tion is experienced by the Catholic community, it is timely for some kind of 
analysis to be carried out. Otherwise, there is a danger that the word aliena-
tion will simply become a rhetorical device for political point scoring. 
Already, in fact, some spokesmen for the majority Protestant community 
have pointed to the alienation that they feel, for example, at policemen be-
ing gunned down in the streets. This sort of counter charge, based as it un-
doubtedly is on a real sense of grievance, risks devaluing the intrinsic worth 
of 'alienation' as a political concept. The experience of alienation, claimed 
by the Catholic community has important policy implications. The state 
must, presumably, react to alienation if it perceives it as being widespread. 
To ignore alienation, or to wish it away by pretending it is not there, could 
lead to policies that are not simply unhelpful, but actually counter-
productive. 
In this paper, the term alienation will be operationalized along a con-
tinuum ranging from abstentionism at one extreme to support for violence 
against the state, at the other. The actual components of alienation that are 
being examined here are (in ascending order of gravity): 
(a) identification with a national ethos distinct from the national ethos 
of the majority 
(b) support for policies involving another state in policy-making; and, 
at the same time, abstentionism from the political process within 
the state 
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(c) lack of support for, and hostility to, the judicial system, the forces 
of law and order, and the penal system of the state 
(d) support for political parties that condone violence as a means of ef. 
fecting political change; support for paramilitary groups; support 
for violence to overthrow the state. 
Fortunately for the social scientist, there are numerous mass opinion 
surveys in Northern Ireland that can be used to facilitate a reasonably ac-
curate measurement of the four components of alienation outlined above. 
Mass opinion surveys can be buttressed by election results and the policy 
programmes of political parties. From such measurement, a num ber of 
hypotheses suggest themselves: 
(a) the Catholic community experiences alienation to a greater or 
lesser degree in terms of the above components 
(b) alienation is, however, experienced in varying degrees of severity; 
and socioeconomic status, age and political party affiliation will be 
variables strongly associated with experience of alienation 
(c) tensions within the Catholic community are attributable not so 
much to the differential experience of alienation, but to the means 
of overcoming it. 
Our analysis will proceed in three steps. First, we will place the 
Catholic community in its demographic context. Second, in the main body 
of the paper, we will analyse each of the four components of alienati on in 
terms of mass opinion survey evidence . Thirdly, we will reappraise each of 
our hypotheses in the light of the evidence that has been adduced, and con-
clude with an assessment of the extent to which they can be confirme d or re-
jected. 
The Catholic community 
The national population census in the United Kingdom is conducted 
once every ten years. The most recent census (1981) is not a completely 
reliable statement of the religious complexion of the Northern Ireland 
population because there was a considerable resistance (especially among 
Catholics) to the question on the religion of the respondent and, to a lesser 
extent, to filling out the census form at all. It has been estimated that 22% 
of the total population in Northern Ireland failed to state their religion 
either because they refused to answer the relevant question or because they 
refused to fill in a form. This short-fall is reckoned to be about twice as 
great as that of the previous census in 1971. • This resistance to the census 
can itself be regarded as a symptom of alienation in the Catholic communi-
ty: census forms were burnt in public on the streets, and a female census 
enumerator was shot dead. 
As part of its task of ensuring that employment patterns reflect the 
local denominational structure of the population, the Fair Employ ment 
Agency in Northern Ireland undertook a study to ascertain, more accurately 
than the 1981 census, the size of the Catholic community. 5 This Report 
made use of school registers, parochial records, and government-spo nsored 
household surveys. The Report, published in 1985, concluded that the 
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C tholic share of the total population (1,562,200) was 39.1 % in 1981, com-
a ed with 340/o as reported in the 1981 census (and 31 % in the 1971 
pa~sus). The Catholic community is relatively youthful: 460/o of the 
c~der-15's in the Province were Catholic, and 36% of the adults. Moreover, 
~e fertility rate remains higher among Catholics than Protestants (the ratio 
f children to married women for Catholics and Protestants is 2.57 and 1.6 
~espectively). Of the 26 loc~l government districts in Nort~er~ Ireland, eig~t 
have a majority of Catholic adults, but twelve have a maJonty of Catholic 
schoolchildren. Given the age profile of the Catholic community, and its 
relatively higher fertility rate, it has been suggested that the minority in 
Northern Ireland could become a majority early in the next century. If we 
extrapolate present reproductive differentials between the two com-
munities, and assume no emigration, it is possible to foresee the Catholic 
community becoming a majority of the voting-age population by the year 
2025.6 
The purpose of the foregoing remarks is to emphasize that the Catholic 
minority in Northern Ireland is (a) a very large minority and (b) increasing 
in size both relatively and absolutely. This has important repercussions for 
our discussion of alienation among Catholics. It is easier for a group that 
constitutes, say, 5% of the total population (e.g. Protestants in the 
Republic of Ireland), to accept that its political leverage or access to 
economic resources may be marginal in terms of the national total. It is 
much more difficult for a minority constituting 40% of the population to 
accept inferior treatment in economic, political or judicial domains. As the 
relative size of the Catholic community increases, the pressure on the na-
tional government in London to accommodate these increased demands 
(especially when expectations are higher) will increase pari passu . 
On this 'bedrock of alienation' lies a substructure of perceived relative 
deprivation vis-a-vis the chosen reference group i.e . the Protestant majori-
ty. In the political sphere, a high degree of overlap 1 between religious af-
filiation and party identification means that the Catholic minority parties 
have been effectively excluded from policy-making since 1922. The refusal 
of the Protestant majority parties to countenance any form of 'partnership' 
or 'consociationalism" as a formula for giving Catholics access to real 
political power, has alienated the two main Catholic parties from the 
political process. This marginality of the Catholic community to the 
political process is compounded by its marginality in other key state agen-
cies e.g. the police (where Catholic participation is about 10%); the Civil 
Service (where a recent report 9 showed that 'Roman Catholics are not ade-
quately represented at the key policy-making levels'); and in the judiciary 
where only three out of twenty judges are Catholics. 
More immediate, perhaps, is the marginality of the Catholic communi-
ty to the region's economic life. Aunger 10 has shown that 'there is a marked 
tendency for Protestants to dominate the upper occupational classes while 
Catholics are found predominantly in the lower classes.' Aunger also found 
that Catholics are two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than 
Protestants. In his 1978 mass opinion survey, Moxon-Browne found 7% of 
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his Protestant respondents and 14% of his Catholic respondents without 
jobs. 11 Catholic males are particularly badly affected. They constit ute less 
than 21 % of the economically active population, but 44% of the 
unemployed. Within work contexts, Protestants are more likely to be found 
in supervisory roles or high status positions than are Catholics. Thus in the 
medical sector, for example, 21 % of doctors are Catholic, but 43% of 
nurses. In education, Catholics have 15% of the administrative posit ions 
but 39% of those in teaching. The rather high proportion of Catholics in 
non-manual occupations is attributed by Aunger to the need of the Catholic 
community to 'service' itself. Thus teachers and clergymen account for one-
third of Catholic non-manual occupations while the equivalent figure for 
the Protestant community is 19%. In a highly segregated society, the ex-
istence of a Catholic middle class, whose primary role is to cater to the 
needs of its own community, does little to mitigate the margina lity of 
Catholics in the economy generally. 
The components of 'alienation' 
We turn now to consider the four components of Catholic alienation 
mentioned earlier. The first of these was 'identification with a national 
ethos distinct from the national ethos of the majority.' The birth of North-
ern Ireland as a political entity was destined to guarantee a bifurcate d sense 
of national identity within its boundaries. Ireland had never been absorbed 
politically or culturally into the United Kingdom as effectively as Scotland 
or Wales. In 1920, Northern Ireland might have left the United Kingdom 
had it not been for the determination of a majority of its inhabitants to re-
main part of a British state. The resulting constitutional formu la was a 
messy compromise (a devolved government) that pleased no-one. Catholics 
felt aggrieved that they were now 'trapped' in a 'Protestant state;' the Pro-
testants felt aggrieved that their region was now to be governed at one 
remove from London; and the British government was less than pleased at 
being unable to offload responsibility for the region onto a government in 
Dublin . 
The legacy of this settlement was that national identity became a 
divisive concept. Broadly speaking, Catholics tended to look south to the 
government in Dublin as the appropriate focus for their Irish nation al iden-
tity. Protestants continued to look towards London as the focus for their 
British identity. Politics within the region became rooted in the constitu-
tional question: most Catholics persisted in feeling that their identit y could 
not be given true expression except in an all-Ireland state (and this aspira-
tion was given some legitimacy by the Constitutional claim to the territory 
of Northern Ireland by the Republic of Ireland). Most Protestants persisted 
in their fear that their British identity would be in jeopardy if Irish unity was 
ever achieved, and in their belief that their economic, political and cultural 
interests could only be safeguarded within a British state . 
Opinion survey evidence suggests that Catholics are surer of their na-
tional identity than are Protestants. When asked to indicate their national 
'label,' Catholics will overwhelmingly reply 'Irish' while Protest ant s may 
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'Ulster' or 'British.' Rose argues that Protestants national identity is 
s:tly based on a negative reaction to being thought of as 'Irish:' they may 
~ vague about what they are, but they are sure about what they are not. 
T~is is confirmed in Rose's finding that most Irish people a_ttribute their na-
f onality to being 'born and bred' (93% of the group) while 53% of those 1 ho see themselves as British attribute this to being 'under British rule' (an 
~ herently less secure basis for national allegiance). 12 
!fl In Table 1, we can see the extent to which national identity follows 
eligious lines in Northern Ireland. We can also see that, in the ten-year 
~eriod (1968-78), being British (and not being Irish) has become more im-
portant for Protestants. 
Table 1 
Nonhern identity in Northern Ireland: 
Comparisons between 1968 and 1978 
Which of these terms best describes the way you usually think of yourself? British. Irish, Ulster, Sometimes Quesuon: British, Somc1imes lrish, Anglo-Irish, Other? 
British 
Irish 
Ulster 
Catholics 0/o 
1968 1978 
IS IS 
76 69 
S 6 
Protestants 0/o 
1968 1978 
39 67 
20 8 
32 20 
N 8 Percentages arc rounded to the nearest digiL Responses for 'British' 'Irish' and 'Ulster' only are shown . 
. . N = 1291 (1968) 1277 (1978). 
Sourc,: E. Moxon -Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland. Alder shot: Gower (1983), p , 6. 
In addition to this clear evidence that Catholic identify with the na-
tional ethos of the inhabitants of the Republic of Ireland, there is also 
evidence that they have more contact with them. In answer to the question 
'Have you ever travelled to the Republic?' 64% of Catholics but only 37% 
of Protestants replied that they visited on 'many occasions' or 'regularly.' 13 
Next, we consider the second component of alienation: 'support for 
policies involving another state in policy-making; and, at the same time 
abstentionism from the political process within the state.' The largest party 
in the Catholic community is the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP). It was founded in 1970 as the heir to the Nationalist Party that had 
carried the banner for Catholic opposition to the regime in Northern 
Ireland ever since its inception. The aim of the SDLP was, and still is, to act 
as the party of 'constitutional nationalism' playing the role of 'legitimate 
opposition' to the majority-dominated political system in the Province. 
Throughout, the party has been hampered by its inbuilt numerical inferiori-
ty and this has caused the party leadership (especially under John Hume) to 
attempt a broadening of the political debate to include (or involve) at one 
time or another various external actors e.g. the Dublin government, the 
British government, the EEC, and the United States. 
The latest phase in this broadening process was the establishment of the 
New Ireland Forum in 1982. This was a conference of four political parties 
(three from the Republic, and the SDLP from Northern Ireland) whose task 
it was to map out a blueprint for a 'new Ireland' in which Catholic and Pro-
testant, north and south, would peacefully coexist. The Report from the 
Forum mapped out three possible scenarios for the future of Ireland but 
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each was eventually ruled out by the British government as being imprac-
tical at this time . 
For our purposes, the importance of the New Ireland Forum was that it 
represented an attempt by the SDLP to enlist the involvement of political 
parties in another state; and thus reflected the alienation of the party from 
the status quo in Northern Ireland. The idea that the government of the 
Republic should be involved in any political settlement in Northern Ireland 
is one that is very attractive to Catholics (but distasteful to Protestants who 
see such involvement as the 'meddling' of a 'foreign power' in the inte rnal 
affairs of the United Kingdom). Successive opinion surveys show how im-
portant the involvement of the Republic is for Catholics. In 1978 780/o of 
Catholics agreed that 'in any political settlement in Northern Irelan d the 
Irish government would have to be consulted' (300/o of Protestants). Two 
years later, in response to the suggestion that the Republic's government 
'should be involved in discussions about the future form of governm ent in 
Northern Ireland' 580/o of Catholics (140/o of Protestants) agreed." In 1984, 
when asked if the government of the Republic of Ireland should 'hav e any 
say in constitutional changes affecting Northern Ireland, or not' 61 OJo f 
Catholics said Yes (100/o of Protestants). 15 
The two principal political parties, in the Catholic comm unity, the 
SDLP and Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), have followed an abst ent ionist 
policy with regard to some aspects of the political process in Northern 
Ireland. Both parties now participate in elections at four different levels of 
representation: local government; the regional assembly (in Belfast); the na-
tional parliament (in London); and the European Parliame nt (in 
Strasbourg, France) . However, a distinction can be made between the two 
parties' policy regarding taking up seats after an election. PSF takes its seats 
in the local government elections but not in the regional assembly or the na-
tional parliament, whereas the SDLP takes its seats in the local government 
elections, in the national and European Parliament, but not in the regional 
Assembly. The objection of PSF to taking its seats in the regional and na-
tional forum is that it does not wish to accord them legitimacy, whereas the 
local government councils are seen as valuable channels of influence to and 
from grass-roots opinion. The SDLP takes its seats in all cases except the 
regional Assembly because it regards the Assembly, established in 1982, as 
being inadequate since it has no 'Irish dimension' (i.e. no link with the 
Republic of Ireland). This policy of abstentionism, followed in diff erent 
degrees by the two Catholic parties means that the Catholic community has 
virtually no representation in the regional Assembly 16 and only one 
representative in the Westminster Parliament (out of 17 MP's from North-
ern Ireland). Abstentionism is clearly a popular policy in the Catholic com-
munity since both parties have, between them, held on to their share of the 
vote in the last three elections. Participation in elections is a way of receiv-
ing a mandate for abstentionism. Abstentionism is a clear sympto m of 
political alienation. 
Our third component of alienation was 'lack of support for, and 
hostility to, the judicial system, the forces of law and order, and the penal 
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tem.' For the Catholic community, the way the law is applied and en-
sfys ed is a litmus test of the state's declared intention of providing impartial 
ore l d" . f . b . 
. tice for all its citizens . Consequent y, any 1ssat1s action must ea maJor 
JUS . . 
contribution to alienation. 
The legitimacy of the state is inextricably tied up with the legal 
easures required to maintain law and order e.g. the Emergency Provisions 
:ct 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984. Both Acts shift the 
onus of proof on to the accused in some circumstances e.g. possession of 
firearms or explosives found on premises in the case of the EPA, and in the 
case of the PTA, an individual can be required to live in a part of the United 
Kingdom for reasons which are unspecified and against which it is therefore 
difficult to construct a defence. 11 A range of offences in both Acts are tried 
in special courts without a jury. The EPA still contains within it a provision 
for internment without trial although this is currently in abeyance. 
However, a source of considerable grievance is that suspects are being 
remanded without trial for periods of one or two years awaiting their cases 
to come to court. In March 1984 the House of Commons was told that 108 
people had spent more than a year in custody awaiting trial. 
Another issue that has become a source of grievance and controversy is 
the use of 'supergrasses' i.e. the convicting of a number of accused persons 
on the evidence of one person who is himself accused of a serious crime. 
There are a number of objections that have been raised to the use of 
'supergrasses': an individual may settle old scores by implicating a person 
he dislikes; the police may be tempted to construct false evidence for the 
supergrass to use in his ' story;' the payment of money and the granting of 
immunity from prosecution to the supergrass means that a terrorist may 
escape trial and punishment. In general, the system of supergrasses has 
tended to discredit the judicial system and is partly to blame for the aliena-
tion of the Catholic community from it. 
In the last two years the apparent adoption of a 'shoot to kill' policy on 
the part of the security forces has further alienated the Catholic community. 
The members of the police and army are almost exclusively Protestant, the 
victims of the shootings invariably Catholic. During 1983, seventeen people 
were killed by either the British Army or the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC). Thirteen members of the security forces were charged in connection 
with seven of these killings. In all cases there were long delays in bringing 
the cases to court; and in all cases the soldiers and police were acquitted. 
Even moderate Catholic opinion has been alienated by these apparent 
travesties of ju stice. In a recent policy document, the SDLP says: 
The fact that these trials were heard in non-jury courts 
with the repeated appearances of the same judges in 
almost every case gave rise to a serious questioning of 
the impartiality of the judiciary and whether it was now 
legal for British soldiers or the RUC to kill civilians with 
impunity. The situation unfortunately remains un-
changed with no solider or policeman being convicted of 
a killing of a civilian while on duty in the streets of 
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Northern Ireland. Such a position has, must and con-
tinues to lead, to great alienation from the judicial pro-
cess. 18 
The use of plastic bullets by the security forces, as a riot control 
weapon, has been condemned by the European Parliament and avoided in 
all parts of the United Kingdom except Northern Ireland. By the beginning 
of 1985 fifteen people had been killed by plastic bullets, some of the victims 
being children under 15. The use of plastic bullets has been condemned by 
the SDLP since they sometimes kill innocent bystanders; they represent an 
excessively dangerous weapon in circumstances where 'minimum force' is 
the legal maxim governing riot control; and the rules governing their use are 
often broken by the security forces. 19 The failure to prosecute, let alone 
convict, those who have killed civilians with plastic bullets has 'contri buted 
and continues to contribute to the alienation of a substantial and increasing 
section of the nationalist population from the judicial system as a whole. •20 
In sum, the panoply of special laws in Northern Ireland gives the RUC 
and Army the legal back-up for stopping, searching, detaining, arresting 
and questioning individuals (mainly young unemployed Catholics) and this 
constant surveillance by the forces of law and order can itself breed resent-
ment, and a sense of alienation which, in turn, only makes the task of these 
forces harder in the future. In a society where national identity is divided, it 
would be more conducive to gaining the support of 'Irish' Catholics for the 
judicial system if flags, crests, emblems and other symbols of 'British' iden-
tity were erased from the court buildings. The alienation of many Catholics 
from the judicial system is emphasized when they feel that they are receiving 
'British' or 'Protestant' justice in the courts. 
In Table 2, we set out some opinion survey evidence that indicat es the 
extent to which Catholics are unsupportive of the law and order being 
dispensed in Northern Ireland. 
Qu .. tlon 
How fair do you 1hink 1hc 
RUC is in the discharge of 
its duties in Northern Ireland? 
Question 
Do you think that in rhe main 
the legal sys1em in Northern 
Ireland dispenses justice 
very fairly, fairly, unfairly, 
or very unfairly? 
Qu .. uon 
Do you approve or disapprove 
of the use of plastic bullets 
by the security forces as a 
weapon during riots? 
Question 
Do you think 1ha1 !he evidence 
of supergrasses should be or 
should not be admissible 
without corrobora1ion in 1hc 
trials of those charged with 
1crroris1•tYp(" offences in 
Nonhern Ireland? 
Belfast Telegraph•Price Waterhouse Survey 
January 1985 
Table 2 
Very fair 
Fair 
Very fairly 
Fairly 
Unfairly 
Very unfairly 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Should be 
Should no, be 
N = 955 
Source: Be/fas, Telegraph 6 February 1985, p, 7 
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Catholics "lo 
4 
43 
4 
32 
37 
20 
9 
87 
10 
81 
Proleslaot~ f/o 
37 
59 
25 
64 
7 
2 
86 
8 
35 
46 
The fourth and final component of alienation consists of 'support for 
J'f cal parties that condone violence as a means of effecting political 
p~ 
1
n~e· support for paramilitary groups; support for violence to overthrow 
\ a stat'e. • This component reflects alienation at its most intense: a desire to 
t ~ect the system by force rather than reform it from within. This 
reJ 1· . I . I . . dichotomy within the Catho 1c commuruty - evo ut10n versus revo utton - 1s 
atched, respectively, by the struggle between SDLP and PSF. These two 
m arties have been competing for the soul of the Catholic community. In the 
iast three elections, for the regional Assembly in 1982, for the Westminster 
Parliament in 1983, and for the European Parliament in 1984, PSF won 
350/o, 430Jo and 380Jo respectively of the Catholic vote . 
The policies of the PSF party, and the extent of the support for the par -
ty embody the more extreme forms of alienation found in the Catholic 
c;mmunity. The party sees itself, and is widely perceived to be, the 
'political wing' of the IRA. Its principal goal is to expel British influence 
from Ireland and unite the country. In the meantime, it takes part in all 
elections, but only takes its seats in the local government councils. It con-
dones the violence of the IRA on the grounds that this violence is a justified 
response to the presence of British troops on Irish soil. 
The rapid emergence of the PSF as an electoral force dates back to the 
hunger strikes of 1981. These hunger strikes, staged by IRA prisoners claim-
ing recognition of their 'political status,' resulted in ten deaths. The British 
government resolutely refused to make any concessions, and this obduracy 
Jed to the politicisation of a dormant republican (i.e. extreme nationalist) 
vote in the Catholic community. The demonstrations of popular support 
for the hunger strikers led to a new awareness of the political leverage that 
might be derived from participating in elections. These voters had previous-
ly stayed at home: now this dormant alienation was transformed into votes 
for an anti-system party, a party that not only fought elections but also con-
doned violence as a means of political change. As the party conference 
heard that November (1981) it was the 'ballot paper in this band and an 
Armalite in this hand.' Although the popular support for the hunger 
strikers never really engulfed the entire Catholic community, the response 
(or lack of response) from the British Government to the strike went a long 
way to crystallize hitherto ill-defined alienation on the part of even 
moderate Catholics who had become frustrated at the lack of political pro-
gress within Northern Ireland. Thus the hunger strikes acted as a catalyst: 
PSF was able to take the tide of opportunity at its flood, and even the SDLP 
was forced to adopt a more militant posture . Long simmering frustration, 
and a feeling that even the non-violent constitutionalism of the SDLP was 
failing to get a response from the British government, served to benefit PSF 
whose ambivalent attitude towards violence, and more forthright condem-
nations of Britain, seemed appropriate responses to those who had nothing 
to lose, and possibly something to gain, by rejecting the status quo. 
The attitude of the PSF towards violence is undoubtedly part of its 
electoral appeal. It is also one of the principal features that distinguishes it 
from SDLP supporters. It is sometimes alleged that a vote for PSF is a 'vote 
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for violence' but this is not wholly true as the figures in Table 3 
demonstrate. There is a widespread view within PSF that violence is 
sometimes justifiable if only because of the lack of any alternative paths 
towards political change. However, there are other facets of the PSF 'im-
age' that attract voters' support. There are shown in the subseq uent table 
(Table 4). 
Table 3 
Question: How strongly do you agree or disagree that the use of violence can sometimes be justified to bring about polhical 
change? 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree 
D.K./ No opinion 
Source: MORI Poll (unpublished) June 1984 
Sinn Fein 'lo 
70 
7 
22 
I 
N= 1639 
Table 4 
SDLP% 
7 
8 
81 
4 
Statement which fit respondents' ideas and impressions or Sinn Fein. 
1Extrcmc' 
'Makes the Bri1ish 
take notice of the 
nationalists' 
1Tough' 
• Active in the local 
community' 
'EviJ' 
'Has good policies' 
'Offers most hope of 
a solution to the 
troubles' 
'Represents people 
like me' 
Inn Fein Volcn •10 
IO 
84 
34 
56 
2 
58 
51 
58 
Source: MORI Poll (unpublished) June 1984 N=562 
'Has good leaders" 
•1•ve always sup~ 
por1ed 1he par1y's 
views' 
'Ou, or ,ouch' 
'Behind the times' 
'Trustworthy' 
·caring' 
'Moderate' 
"Too cooptrativc with 
'Britain ' 
Sinn Fein Voters 'It 
41 
42 
2 
2 
21 
16 
9 
We have already established that there is considerable support among 
PSF voters for the use of violence to bring about political change. We have 
also seen (in Table 4) that the appeal of the party is broader than a mere 
mandate for the gunman. Clearly, PSF voters perceive their party as being 
well-led, active in local communities, representative of its grass-roots and, 
above all, (cited by 840Jo of PSF voters) able to make the British government 
take notice of nationalist demands. As the PSF is the 'political wing' of the 
IRA it is worth considering the views taken by PSF supporters towards the 
IRA. Does the link between the party and the paramilitary organization 
constitute a life-support system for the party? The answer appears to be 
'yes.' Whereas 390Jo of SDLP voters agree that the 'IRA are basically 
patriots and idealists,' this figure rises to 770Jo for PSF vote rs. 21 On the 
more specific policy question of whether PSF should 'renounce the armed 
campaign of the IRA' only 220Jo of PSF voters agree (exactly the same 
percentage that is against violence for political change in Table 3). 
The support for the violence of the IRA among four out of five of PSF 
voters represents the extreme point on the continuum of 'a lienation' rang-
ing across our four 'components:' at one extreme, a desire to work within 
the system, but at the other a marked inclination to overthrow the system by 
force. An investigation of the principal demographic features of the PSF 
support shows it to be young, from the lower socioeconomic strata, often 
unemployed, and more likely to be male than female. Some of these 
84 
features of PSF support can be seen in Table 5, while comparisons with the 
SDLP can be made. 
Table 5 
Som• comparisons between •h• SDLP and PSF. 
Base: Catholic voters in European election 1984 (June) 
Age PSF SDLP 
18-34 380/o 460/o 
35-54 220/, 580/, 
55+ 16'1, 650/, 
Gender PSF SDLP 
Male 340/o 540/o 
Female 240/o 640/, 
Socioeconomic 
statw: PSF SDLP 
ABCI 200/o 
66'1, 
C2DE 330/o 510/, 
Sourtt: MORI Poll (unpublishtd) June 1984 N~4S1 
Comparisons with the 'constitutional' SDLP are instructive, PSF is a 
young party and is firmly based in the lower socioeconomic echelons of the 
Catholic community. About 500Jo of PSF voters are under 34 (compared 
with 290/o of SDLP voters). One-fifth of PSF support comes from non-
manual socioeconomic groups, while one-third of SDLP support does. 31 OJo 
of PSF supporters are unemployed; but only 130Jo of SDLP supporters. 
Asked what the cause of the Northern Ireland problem is, PSF supporters 
are more likely to see it as a clash of national identity, and less likely to see it 
as a problem of 'terrorism' than SDLP supporters. Both Catholic parties 
evince strong dissatisfaction with the British Government's handling of the 
situation in the Province, but this dissatisfaction is much stronger in PSF 
than it is in the SDLP. The crucial difference between the two parties is their 
attitudes towards violence. As we have seen (see Table 3) PSF supporters 
are much more likely to condone violence than SDLP supporters and while 
290Jo of PSF voters say they 'strongly' agree that violence is sometimes 
justified, only 1 OJo f SDLP voters fall into this extreme category. 22 
Conclusion: policy implications 
Faced with widespread alienation within the Catholic community, 
ranging from those who accept the status quo and are willing to make it 
work, through to those who see violent change as the only hope of reform, 
the British government is forced to steer a middle course between the men of 
violence and the 'constitutional' politicians. But, unfortunately, conces-
sions made to the latter are often seen, and claimed, as concessions to the 
former. 
Since 1969, when the present spate of civil unrest erupted, the British 
government has responded to the crisis along three avenues: security, 
economics, politics. In the political field, there have been several attempts 
to construct a framework of devolved government within which the two 
communities could cooperate to their mutual benefit. So far, this has not 
been achieved. The brief power-sharing experiment of 1974 lasted five 
months but was eventually wrecked by Loyalist (i.e. extreme Protestant) 
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reactions to the proposed North-South Council of Ireland which was 
perceived as the thin end of a wedge that would lead to a united Ireland . The 
present 78-man Assembly in Belfast is the latest experiment. Its role is pure-
ly advisory and consultative although the intention is that legislative powers 
could be devolved to it if there was sufficient cross-community consensus to 
warrant it. At the moment this seems unlikely as the two Catholic part ies 
PSF and the SDLP, are boycotting the Assembly because it excludes both 
an 'Irish dimension' (i.e. with the Republic) and any real recogniti on of 
Irish identity among Cattiolics in Northern Ireland. Since 1973, propor-
tional representation has been introduced into local and regional elections 
in Northern Ireland (a novelty in the United Kingdom) with the aim of 
enhancing the influence of the Catholic minority in political affairs . While 
this has undoubtedly happened, it has also led to the splitting of the confes-
sional 'blocs,' into two parties each, so that extremists on both sides now 
have parties to themselves (PSF for the Catholics, DUP for the 
Protestants). The prospects for reconciliation between moderates in each 
community is now more remote because the 'moderate' parties (OUP for 
Protestants, SDLP for Catholics) have to look over their shoulders at the 
more militant policies of the parties on their flanks. 
Security policy has made progress in its primary aim: the reducti on in 
the number of fatalities in the Province. In 1972 over four hundre d people 
died in the region; now the annual total is less than one hundred. The cost 
has been high in terms of alienating the Catholic community. Special 
legislation giving the police wide powers of arrest, detention, and inter roga-
tion; long periods of remand; the abolition of juries for many trials; the use 
of supergrasses; the apparent immunity from conviction of policemen or 
soldiers who murder civilians; and the overwhelming Protestant comp osi-
tion of the security forces: all these facets of the security policy of the 
Government combine to minimize the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of 
the Catholic community. The policy of 'Ulsterisation' - the policy of 
transferring the burden of security to locally recruited personnel - has done 
little to kindle hope in the Catholic community that law and order will be 
impartially administered. 
Economic policy has consisted of building up the infrastructure of the 
Province - roads, houses, harbours, energy supplies - so that foreign invest-
ment will stimulate greater employment opportunities. Per capita expen-
diture is higher in the Province than in the rest of the United Kingdom: and 
so is the dependence on welfare handouts. 
The Government's policy towards PSF consists of a 'twin-track' ap-
proach: encouraging constitutional nationalism (as expressed in the SDLP) 
and ostracising PSF representatives at Ministerial level. However, PSF is a 
legal party and both civil servants and local councillors are expected to deal 
with them in the normal way. This partial boycott of PSF representatives is 
defended on the grounds that PSF refuses to condemn violence, and as a 
way of bolstering the 'parliamentary' tactics of the SDLP. 
Faced by an alienated minority, a central government has, in theory, a 
range of options extending from total suppression of the minority to a full 
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nition of its separate identity via the creation of a separate state. 
recog 1· · · 1 N th I I d . Neither of these extreme p~ I~Ies IS re evant to or er~ re_ an sI?ce sup-
sion of a minority cons1stmg of 40% of the population IS unthmkable, 
pres b h · · 1· f h d territorial separateness is ruled out Y t e mtermmg mg o t e two com-
anunities. In between these extremes there lies a variety of options including 
:nsociationalism, cantonisation, total absorption, pluralism and reloca-
~ion. so far, the Government has bee~ attempting a policy of 'i_ntegration' 
or 'homogenisation' - a policy of treatmg the Cathohc commumty as equal 
citizens of the United Kingdom: and much progress has been made in 
legislating away discrimin~tory pra~tices_and prov_iding adequate _economic 
resources. But it looks as If even this policy, even 1f successful, will have to 
make way for a new policy of pluralism (or more strictly 'binationalism') in 
order to satisfy the aspirations of the militant elements in the Catholic com-
munity. Already there have been straws in the wind: talk of the 'Irish identi-
ty' in Government circles, the financing of an Irish speaking school in 
Belfast, the refusal to proscribe PSF, and most recently the banning of pro-
vocative Protestant marches through Catholic residential areas. Otherwise, 
very little has been done officially to grant the Irish identity of Catholics its 
legitimate place in Northern Ireland, or to give Catholics access to policy-
making in a meaningful sense, or to ensure that law, order and justice apply 
to aJl without fear or favour. If alienation means 'feeling a stranger in one's 
own country' then there is scope for making the Catholic community feel 
that they have a stake in the society they inhabit: if one is treated like an 
outsider, it is likely that one will behave like an outsider. 
Attempts by the Government to promote 'binationalism' run into the 
problem of Protestant opposition. Lately, one has heard the phrase 'Protes-
tant alienation' - a term loosely referring to the reactions of IRA violence, 
and 'reforms' by the Government to enhance Catholic political and 
economic participation. The situation is not a bi-polar one with the Pro-
testants and British ranged against the Catholic community. On the con-
trary the situation is triangular: both communities are to some extent 
alienated from British rule, 23 albeit for different reasons and to different 
degrees. Thus the strategy of the Government, or any government faced by 
a multi-ethnic society, has to be that of 'balancing' interests and seeking the 
issues that bind rather than those that divide. Given the demographic trends 
in Northern Ireland, it seems advisable for the 'majority' of today to 
negotiate the terms for survival of tomorrow's minority. 
87 
NOTES 
'The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon (1973). 
'Published in the summer of 1984. 
'Bishop Cahal Daly, Communities Without Consensus. Dublin: Irish Messenger Publica 
lions (1984), p. 5. • 
'See D. Eversley and V. Herr, The Roman Catholic Population of Northern Ireland in 
1981: A Revised Estimate. Belfast: Fair Employment Agency (1985), p. I. 
'Ibid. 
'D. Watt (ed), The Constitution of Northern Ireland: Problems and Prospects. London· 
Heinemann (1981), p. 88. · 
'See E. Moxon-Browne, Na/ion, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland. Aldershot: Gower 
(1983), p. 84. 
'See A. Lijphart, 'Review Article: The Northern Ireland Problem: Case Theories and 
Solutions' in British Journal of Political Science, vol. 5. 
'Fair Employment Agency, Report of an Investigation by the FEA for Northe rn Ireland 
into the non-industrial Civil Service. Belfast: FEA (1983), p. 65. 
'
0R.J. Cormack and R.D. Osborne (eds), Religion, Education and Employme nt: Aspects 
of Equal Opportunity in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Appletree Press (1983), pp. 25-41. 
"E. Moxon-Browne, op.cit., p. 83. 
" R. Rose, Government Without Consensus. London: Faber (1971), p. 209. 
"E. Moxon-Browne, op.cit. , p. 30. 
'' Ibid., p. 20. 
''L WT / MORJ Poll (May 1984) N = 1028 (Quota sample). 
"There are, however, five Catholics in the transectarian Alliance Party which has ten seats 
in the Assembly. 
" C. Scorer and P . Hewitt, The Prevention of Terrorism Act. London: NCCL (1981). 
"SDLP, 'Justice' in Northern Ireland. Belfast: SDLP (January 1983) mirneo pp. 11-12. 
" ibid. 
'
0Jbid. 
"MORI Poll (unpublished) June 1984. 
"Ibid. 
"See E. Moxon-Browne, op.cit., p. 56. 
88 
